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DRAFT 5/7/22
New Developments on US Treaty Overrides
Reuven Avi-Yonah
On April 7, 2022, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the tax treaty
between the US and Chile with two reservations. The first reservation states that:
[N]othing in the treaty shall be construed as preventing the United States from
imposing the BEAT tax under section 59A [of the US Internal Revenue Code] on
a company that is a resident of the United States or the profits of a company that
is a resident of Chile that are attributable to a permanent establishment in the
United States.1
The second reservation made a similar statement regarding the interaction between
section 245A of the Code (providing for a participation exemption for dividends from
Controlled Foreign Corporations, or CFCs) and article 23 of the treaty (providing for the
indirect credit, which was repealed when section 245A was enacted in 2017).2
The reason these reservations (which Chile must accept for the treaty to come into
effect) were needed is because of the interaction between treaties and statutes under
the US Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Under that interpretation,
treaties and statutes have the same status, so that the later in time rule controls and a
later statute can override an earlier treaty and vice versa.3
There is an ongoing debate about whether the BEAT overrode the non-discrimination
article of US tax treaties (article 24).4 There is also a lesser debate whether the
1
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and Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., The Beat and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen (August
16, 2018). Tax Notes International, October 22, 2018, p. 383, U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 18019, U of Houston Law Center No. 2018-A10, U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 617, Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232974 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232974.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4102216

1

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 227 [2022]

participation exemption overrode article 23.5 The crux of the debate, as explained in my
earlier article in this review, is whether there can be an override of a treaty without any
explicit Congressional statement to that effect.6
However, there is agreement that a later treaty can override an earlier statute
regardless of whether there was any statement to that effect.7 The treaty with Chile is
one of seven tax treaties that have been languishing in the US Senate for a long time,
from before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 enacted BEAT and the participation
exemption.8 Four of them were protocols that did not amend articles 23 and 24 and
therefore they were eventually ratified in 2020. The other three were full new treaties
and therefore if ratified they would override the BEAT and arguably the participation
exemption (although the latter argument is weak). Hence the need for the two
reservations.
Is this whole complication necessary? There is way out of it, first suggested by Rebecca
Kysar, a tax professor who is now at the US Treasury office of tax policy. Prof. Kysar
suggested that tax treaties should be non-self-executing, so that they would require
legislation to come into effect.9 In that case, the situation would revert to one that is
familiar to UK readers, namely that all tax treaties require legislation and hence later in
time always controls, like it would between any two statutes that conflict with one
another.
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This remedy would require the extra step of passing legislation through both houses for
a tax treaty to come into effect. But the House of Representatives is not the problem,
because the majority party can usually pass whatever legislation it supports. The
problem is in the Senate, because while under arcane Senate rules 60 votes are
needed to move legislation, the bar is even higher for treaty ratification (67 votes), so
having to pass legislation to make tax treaties effective is in fact easier than getting
them through the Senate ratification process. And as Prof Kysar argued, it is also better
from a constitutional and democratic perspective for treaties that increase or decrease
revenues to be passed through the much more democratically representative House
than only be ratified by the very unrepresentative Senate.
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